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Abstract 
This paper examines the “activist effect” on the levels and structures of CEO 
compensation when a company is targeted by a sample of activist groups. Activist 
investors are focused funds that use their resources to influence management of target 
investments in an effort to increase shareholder value. Due to their efforts to impose 
return enhancing agendas on the management of targets, activists have developed a 
reputation as “raiders” and are commonly feared by management.  In this paper, the 
nature of activist investing is discussed, including a review of previous research on 
activism, and an explanation of why compensation changes are a logical focus for 
extension of the previous research. The study is based on a sample of hand-collected data 
of 53 activist investments from 2007 to 2008. This analysis finds that contrary to fears, 
evidence suggests that the presence of an activist – particularly larger more famous 
activist investors – is associated with an increase in total CEO compensation achieved 
through a change in compensation structure.  
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I. Introduction 
This paper will examine whether activist investors have had a meaningful impact 
on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in corporations targeted by activist 
groups.  While shareholder activism is by no means a new phenomenon, hedge funds 
focused on activist investing campaigns are a relatively recent development. As discussed 
in Gillan and Starks’ (2007) paper, The evolution of shareholder activism in the United 
States, traditional shareholder activism by pension and mutual funds has long sought to 
work with management of targeted firms to increase value.  But, such funds’ influence 
over management has been stymied for a variety of reasons, most notably strict regulation 
and conflicts of interest. Activist hedge-funds and activist investors have emerged as a 
significant force over the past decade. They tailor their investment selections, and pursue 
activist strategies, to establish financial and operational controls over their investment 
targets with the intention of unlocking shareholder value. In the end, if the activists’ 
intervention is successful, shareholders could realize a substantial increase in their stock’s 
value. 
Activists are distinct from institutional shareholders on several accounts. First, 
activist investors and activist hedge funds face lighter regulatory burdens than traditional 
investment firms. The lack of strict regulation allows activists to adapt their portfolios to 
best suit the fund’s interest and increase the influence on the management of their 
investments (Black 1998). Due to the fact that activist funds are accessible only to 
institutional clients and not the public, activist funds do not need to maintain a diversified 
portfolio, allowing these activist groups to take large stakes in a few investments. Thus, 
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by controlling a large number of a target company’s shares, activists hold significant 
power to push across their agendas.1   
Second, activist funds are focused exclusively on maximizing shareholder value. 
Activist fee structures are generally based on a portion of excess returns. As a result, fund 
managers can direct all of their efforts towards achieving short and long-term profit 
objectives. They avoid building the relationships and pursuing the non-return driven 
agendas with the target company that are commonplace with institutional investors 
(Black 1998). 
These advantageous investing conditions have allowed activist investors to 
become very successful in producing increased shareholder returns, as summarized by 
Karpoff (2001). Brav, Jiang, and Kim’s (2010) survey of research on activism provides 
clear evidence that activist funds are quite accomplished in “achieving the goals of 
creating value for shareholders by effectively influencing the governance, capital 
structure decisions, and operating performance of the target companies.”  They found 5-
10% excess returns after the initial investment of activists (Brav, Jian, and Kim 2010). 
Ryan (2006) concluded that activism events that focus on the sale of the target firm and 
changes in a business’ strategies produce the highest short-term jumps in returns. 
Furthermore, Boyson and Moordian’s (2007) long-term analysis shows that there is little 
to no reversion over multiple years following intervention, indicating the value creation is 
both genuine and justified. 
In light of the recent economic recession, executive compensation practices have 
been increasingly in the public eye. The risk-encouraging compensation practices, 
including the issuance of stock options and restricted stock units (RSU), have been 
                                                 
1
 Typical activist agendas will be discussed later in this paper 
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addressed by some as a potential cause of the banking collapse. As a result, compensation 
levels, and the composition of compensation, of top executives has faced increased 
scrutiny.  
It would follow that activists would move to reduce a CEO’s compensation 
package if they deem the CEO to be markedly overpaid, but would be willing to increase 
incentive-based to create an environment that would more effectively lead to maximized 
shareholder value. Activists would, ideally, see this increase in incentive based pay 
simultaneously with a decrease in stock options issued to CEOs because stock options 
encourage risky behavior that may artificially increase shareholder value in the short-
term, but not be in shareholder’s interest in the long-run.  
 
II. Literature Review 
Due to the fact that focused activist hedge funds and activist investors have only 
existed for a short period of time, research on activist investment funds is relatively 
limited and focused almost exclusively on market reactions and firm performance (Brav, 
Jiang, and Kim 2010). Though some previous research classifies the intentions of 
shareholder activism over a large sample of activist campaigns, the matter of potential 
influence on corporate governance and executive compensation has not been analyzed in 
previous work. Furthermore, there is a dearth of research on activist campaigns since the 
early to mid 2000s. As stakeholder activism has evolved, so too must the research on the 
effect of activist efforts. The majority of prior literature on activism (Gillan and Stark 
1996, Karpoff 2001) focuses mainly on the shareholder activism of the late 80’s and 90’s 
as opposed to fund activism of the new millennium. Early shareholder activism consisted 
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of considerably more passive campaigning geared towards monitoring boards of directors 
(Ryan 2006). These institutional shareholders faced vast regulatory impediments, 
conflicts of interest, and other barriers that often rendered their activist intents ineffectual 
(Brav, Jiang, and Kim 2010).  
Bratton (2007) breaks down activist agendas for target investments into five 
major objectives: undervaluation, capital structure issues, business strategy, the sale of 
the target company, and governance concerns that are depressing value. Often activist get 
involved in a company with more than one of the aforementioned agendas in mind as 
they may push for agendas that institute reform on many levels to realize maximum 
shareholder return.  
Agendas revolving around the “undervaluation” thesis are generally the most 
passive. In this scenario, activist investors seek to communicate with management to help 
the company achieve its true intrinsic value. Capital structure oriented agendas seek to 
address the firm’s payout policies and general structure. Activists generally aim to 
generate higher payoffs for all shareholders through potential increases in leverage, 
dividends, or share repurchases. Strategy related agendas focus on making the business 
operation most efficient. These include growth strategies, restructuring, mergers and 
acquisitions strategies, or streamlining the focus of the firm.   
Agendas which focus on the selling of a company of interest and on the corporate 
governance of a company of interest are often seen in conjunction with more aggressive 
tactics on the activist investor’s part (Greenwood and Schor 2009). When activists 
identify an investment with an agenda to sell the business, they often attempt to force the 
sale to a third party via a proxy fight.  Or, the activist firm itself moves to purchase a 
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majority holding in the target. Holderness and Sheehan (1984) theorize that despite 
evidence of the success of activist investors in generating positive excess returns for 
shareholders, these aggressive tactics have created a negative connotation for activist 
funds as “corporate raiders” and “notorious opportunists”. 
Governance agendas also have a tendency to result in aggressive tactics. 
According to Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas (2008) these governance agendas include 
policies as drastic as removing and replacing the CEO, running for board seats, getting 
rid of takeover defenses, and reforming executive compensation to better align the firm 
with fair compensation and shareholder objectives.   
The emerging activist fund industry, this decade, is outfitted with stronger 
financial incentives, greater investable capital, and fewer regulations that allow them to 
pursue agendas that shareholders and institutional investors formerly could not (Brav, 
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas 2008). Unlike institutional investors and traditional 
shareholders, activist funds do not need to maintain balanced portfolios, often allocating a 
significant portion of their capital base to a concentrated investment (Ryan 2006). With 
large-scale investments, activist funds seek to influence the target company based on a 
series of tactics which they believe will result in a sizeable increase in shareholder return, 
on which the funds management fees are based. Activists typically pursue board seats to 
further pressure management to take action.  
Due to this recent rise of specialized activist funds, there has been a spike in 
activist events stemming from campaigns of such investors. Klein and Zur published a 
paper in 2006 which examined 194 hedge-fund activist events between 2003 and 2005.  
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However, they omitted activist events in which the funds did not issue a 13D form.2   A 
more recent study covers a sample of 1,059 activist fund events between 2001 and 2006, 
and analyzes the activist objectives and abnormal returns following these events (Brav, 
Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas, 2008). Other papers by Boyson and Mooradian (2007) and 
Clifford (2005) also look at hedge fund activism prior to 2005 and both focus entirely on 
stock reactions.  
There is a surprising lack of analysis of activist events in the latter half of this decade 
in the published research. During this time period, the markets have seen a great deal of 
volatility and consolidation, presenting ample opportunity for activist funds to identify 
undervalued and underperforming companies to invest in and correct. Concurrent to the 
market volatility in the second half of the decade, excessive and misaligned executive 
compensation has emerged as a major public and fiduciary issue.  
It follows, then, that activist funds, which traditionally have monitored companies’ 
boards and management, would take a particular interest in attempting to reform executive 
compensation practices among their investments as a way to align executives’ interests with 
that of shareholders. While Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, and Thomas’ paper indicates 50 of the 1059 
activist events focused primarily on excessive compensation, there is minimal research done 
on the actual impact of activist investment on the size and structure of executive 
compensation. This paper seeks to evaluate how, if at all, the presence of an activist investor 
changes CEO compensation with the expectation that the activist presence is positively 
associated with  incentive based pay (RSUs and Non-Equity Incentive (NEI) plans), but 
                                                 
2
 13Ds are Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings that must be issued once an investor goes 
over a 5% stake in an investment 
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negatively related with option compensation and, to a lesser degree, fixed pay (bonus and 
salary). 
 
III. Data 
A. Data Sources and Selection 
To begin this study, activist investment events between 2007 and 2009 were identified. 
Since there “is no centralized database of . . . activism” as acknowledged by Brav, Jiang, and 
Kim (2010), to find usable events for this paper, a selection criterion of activist investors and 
activism focused hedge funds needed to be established. Using Lawyerlinks.com, a database 
for legal research, a list was compiled of investment firms legally classified as activists.3 From 
this source, a collection of 49 activism-focused funds were found. While this selection is not 
an exhaustive database, it provided a representative group of the most active and publicly 
identifiable activist funds.  That collection of funds was then narrowed down by eliminating 
those which did not fit within the parameters of this paper.4  
The next step was to identify when the study set of activist funds made their initial 
investments in their target companies. The observation period for initial investments focuses 
on 2006-2008 due to the fact that a change in compensation reporting, specifically how option 
vesting and recognition is reported, took place in 2005. In an effort to compare apples to 
apples, the investment window was selected to reflect compensation changes occurring in a 
time of constant reporting standards. Furthermore, in order to observe changes in executive 
compensation, both preceding and trailing data was required. Thus, with at least 2005 
                                                 
3
 
http://content.lawyerlinks.com/default.htm#http://content.lawyerlinks.com/sec/Proxy/activist_shareholders/
shareholders/activist_shareholders_f_m.htm 
4
 Eliminated funds did not have searchable 13F filings or the fund did not exist throughout the 2005-2009 
timeframe. 
  
12 
compensation as a base, and 2009 compensation as trailing data, any initiated transaction in 
the interim would provide sufficient data for comparison. 
Using 13F filings5initial investments were identified for the funds. Firms with over 70 
holdings at a given time period proved too daunting a task to piece together initial investments 
and had to be excluded from the data set, as did funds that failed to make any investments 
between 2006 and 2008. Useable transactions were defined as those that were initiated in the 
time frame, not sold or taken private, and held for 3 or more quarters by the activist, 
indicating a serious and long term commitment on the part of the investor. With these 
parameters used to identify relevant activist investors and transactions, a final subsample of 
investment targets was compiled. That data set included 12 activist investors and 67 activist 
events (see Table 1). While this is a relatively small sample, it is a quite diverse set of actors 
with total AUM ranging from $100 million to $18.5 billion.6  
 
B.  Metrics and Summary Statistics 
Once the investor and initial investment data was defined, the executive compensation 
data for the companies in which the activist funds invested was gathered, using ExecuComp 
on the WRDS database.7 Data was collected for both the overall level of compensation (total 
executive compensation) and for the structure of the compensation.  Compensation elements 
evaluated included: total options, total restricted stock units (RSU), total salary, total bonus, 
total non-equity incentives (NEI), and total “other annual compensation” of the companies 
from 2005-2009. There were several companies that did not have any accessible 
                                                 
5
 SEC filings in which all institutional investment managers who are managing over $100 million on the 
last trading day of any month of the calendar year must disclose their holdings on a quarterly basis 
6
 Table 2 shows summary stats of activist investor sample 
7
 http://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
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compensation data because they were too small, and were accordingly cut from the study 
leaving the sample of usable initial investments at 53.8 Table 3 shows the participant target 
companies after the elimination process.  
A simple observation of trends in the executive compensation data shows the dynamic 
compensation landscape from 2007-2009. Table 4 presents the total compensation on an 
annual basis (represented in millions USD) of the companies targeted by activist groups in the 
study sample. The mean total compensation of CEOs in the sample declined from $10.7 
million in 2005 to a mean of $7.8 million in 2009. 
As shown in Table 4, a significant drop in compensation occurred after 2006. A drop 
of this magnitude (over 25%) could be due to the recessionary environment in which the 
managers were operating (failing to hit incentive targets and devaluation in stock options). 
With that being said, these years (2007 and 2008) are also the years of activist entry under 
investigation in this paper, and the impact of the activists will be fleshed out in the analysis 
portion of this research. In order to do so, I will control for year specific effects to separate 
them from activist influences.  
When compared to the total compensation of the entire ExecuComp universe (S&P 
1500) as seen in Table 10, statistics may reveal that compensation is a factor in investment 
selection of activists. The mean total CEO compensation of the activist target selection in the 
screening years (2005 and 2006) is considerably higher than that of the S&P 1500 universe. 
On average, the activist targets’ CEOs received $1.15 million and $1.48 million more in 2005 
and 2006, respectively.9 Surprisingly, however, the difference between CEO total 
compensation in companies influenced by activists and the S&P 1500 universe is even higher. 
                                                 
8
 ExecuComp covers only the S&P 1500 universe, data is uncollectable for companies not included in the 
S&P 1500 
9
 Equivalent to 10.8% and 14.6%  in 2005 and 2006  
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In the year trailing the activist intervention examined in this paper (2009), CEOs of activist 
targeted firms received 31.8% higher total compensation. This could be attributed to one of 
several potential causes. First, if activists influence compensation directly, they move to 
increase total CEO compensation in an effort to ingratiate themselves with management to 
better achieve subsequent goals. Second, activists may simply improve the performance of 
target companies and the CEO is being rewarded for company performance. Third, conflict 
with the CEO at the time of the activist’s investment may result in an effort to force out the 
underperforming CEO, and replace with a new CEO who warrants higher compensation.10 
Looking at the summary statistics of the subcategories of compensation as a percent of 
the total annual compensation similarly indicates sizeable shifts in the years of activist 
investor initial investment. Tables 5 through 9 represent the various components of 
compensation as a percent of the total CEO compensation package in each year from 2005-
2009. The trends in each of these factors of compensation are in line with expectations of 
compensation reform in worsening operational conditions.  
It makes sense that executives would be compensated with a lower proportion of 
guaranteed pay (salary and bonus) on the heels of weakening performance resulting from the 
economic contraction and reduced spending.11 The observable drop in bonus from about 7% 
of executive compensation in 2006 to 2.5% in 2009, and salary comprising 24.5% of total 
compensation dwindling to less than 18% of pay would be in line with activist investors’ 
desire for executives to earn their compensation packages through increasing returns and 
reaching targets that would lead to increased shareholder value. 
                                                 
10
 This possibility is controlled for in the regressions with the CEO tenure variable  
11
 As seen in Table 5 (salary) and Table 6 (bonus) 
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Further evidence of the trend of moving from guaranteed pay to conditional 
compensation can be seen by the increase in non-equity incentive plan pay and restricted 
stock units issued (as percentages of total compensation) as the decade progressed.12 A non-
equity incentive (NEI) plan (also known as Long-Term Incentive plans) is performance-based 
pay where executives are compensated based on their company’s success at meeting 
operational targets set by the firm’s compensation committee as fair goals and expectations. 
Logically, activists prefer a heavy portion of compensation tied to performance as the 
company’s performance tends to translate into jumps in valuation. This trend is evident in the 
data over the last 5 years as NEI plans have expanded from under 4% to over 21% of total 
executive compensation.  
Restricted stock units (RSUs) are a form of conditional equity compensation that, 
unlike options, are not excessively risky. RSUs are equity grants to be made to the executive 
if shares of the company reach a certain level within a designated time frame. RSU grants 
directly align the executive’s financial interests with both the company’s and investors’ 
interests. In the sample of executives used for this paper, RSUs as a percent of compensation 
increased in linear fashion over time, and nearly doubled (from 16% to 32%) during the years 
of activist entry into the sample firms. 
Options, like RSUs, are another form of conditional equity compensation. However, 
the risky nature of options has been in the focus of compensation critics, and a source of 
blame for the financial crisis. Options become more valuable (more likely to be “in the 
money”) as the volatility of the company increases. The decrease in options granted as a 
percentage of compensation (as seen in Table 9) is evident over the time horizon of our data 
set and could be attributed to various factors. Options accounted for an average of over 42% 
                                                 
12
 As seen in Table 7 (NEI) and Table 8 (RSU) 
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of compensation in 2005, but only 17% of compensation in 2009. While activist investors 
might push for this change, it could also be a naturally occurring trend spurred by the 
increased public scrutiny and the fact that options issued to executives in the recessionary 
period might not vest if their businesses are in decline. Table 11 shows a graphical 
representation of the evolution in CEO compensation structure from 2005 to 2009.The actual 
cause of the changes in the level of total compensation and proportions of each payout method 
will be discussed in the methods and results portions of this paper.  
In addition to this historical compensation data, other variables that might play a factor 
in the compensation landscape were collected including both general company metrics such as 
market cap as well as indicators of the activist investor’s power and reputation including 
Assets Under Management (AUM) and references in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) since 
2008. These variables will demonstrate whether the individual activists have a varied effect 
determined by their size and publicity. In a way, these new metrics will magnify the “activist 
presence” variable and could reflect an impact on compensation that is masked by the limited 
influence of smaller, less well known activists. If larger more famous activists are successful 
at influencing CEO compensation, the amplified AUM and WSJ terms will be more 
meaningful. To construct these variables, the dummy variable for the activist presence is 
multiplied with the total AUM or WSJ variable 
 
IV. Methodology 
To analyze the impact of the involvement of activist investment firms on CEO 
compensation, each measure of compensation was regressed, using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), on a series of control variables as well as the activist investor variables. In order to 
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determine whether the activist variables have a tangible effect on the target company’s 
compensation structure and compensation levels, I will control for other factors that could 
impact the compensation landscape. In the absence of other potential compensation drivers, 
the activist variables may just be a proxy for the missing necessary information. The drivers 
of compensation were broken down into three subcategories: firm characteristics, executive 
characteristics, and activist characteristics. Firm characteristics are traits or attributes of the 
target investment independent of other firms, or outside influences.  
Variables such as the market value of the firm and the industry in which the firm 
operates are two factors that could explain changes in compensation from 2005 to 2009. It 
would follow that in a period of increased scrutiny of compensation in certain sectors (i.e. 
banking) that firms within that sector may see increasingly volatile compensation structures 
that are not attributable to activist investors’ impact.  
In order to classify the selected investments into industry groups, Compustat industry 
codes were identified for each investment target. The industry codes are 4 digit identifiers that 
reference the industry. The first two digits of the code can be used to identify similar 
industries. The data set examined in this paper is made up of companies which fall under 7 
distinct groups of industries: financial services, technology, transportation, consumer, retail, 
materials, and telecom. 
Executive characteristics are those that may reveal executives that are more or less 
vulnerable to activist’s influence on overcompensation. The controls used to account for this 
measure of entrenchment are length of tenure, age, and the expected severance package. It is 
expected that longer tenured, older CEOs, with hefty severance pay due at termination are less 
susceptible or accepting of outside influence over pay level and structure. That is, the 
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executives would have a long standing understanding with the compensation committee and 
compensation for such executives may be sticky. At the same time, it could be theorized that 
good, young executives may not be willing to tolerate reductions or refocusing of 
compensation and be less likely to accept the changes and stay in place instead of jumping 
ship. One limitation of the results may be that short of replacing a CEO, a CEO already in 
place may have legal contract that obliges the target to pay various amounts and the activist 
effect on salary could only be seen if the old CEO was forced out and a new one came on with 
new contract terms negotiated with the activists. 
One final control to be accounted for to assure that the activist variables were not 
proxying for economic trends, is a year effect. The time period in question is a very volatile 
period with the economic decline felt across industry. It would be natural then for options to 
fail to vest and incentive targets to be missed, dragging down total compensation. A binomial 
year effect variable was thus created to determine if the change in a measure of compensation 
was attributable to the compensation trends of the year or from the attention of an activist.  
In order to analyze the activists’ role on the various metrics of compensation, a series 
of regressions was run for each of the CEO compensation metrics. The units of compensation 
were regressed initially on the presence of an activist investor and the industry controls. The 
reason the industry control measure is included with the activist presence variable is that it is 
expected that the activist effect will not proxy for industry effects. Therefore, as more 
variables are added to the analysis they will serve to determine if the activist effect variable is 
simply representing other naturally occurring effects or if the activist effect is truly a 
significant determinant of CEO compensation. Once other factors are controlled for in 
subsequent regressions (first the year effects, and then company and CEO characteristics), the 
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regressions were rerun including the activist characteristic variables to see if the size and 
reputation of the activists plays a more significant role in compensation than simply whether 
or not an activist of any size is involved. The two activist characteristics will be run in 
separate regressions due to the fact that they are highly (84%) positively correlated. 
 
V. Results 
A. Total Compensation 
Regression Table A shows the OLS regression output for the determinants of the level 
of total CEO compensation from 2005 to 2009. The initial regressions indicate that at the 5% 
and 10% significance levels the industry effects alone have an impact on compensation while 
the activist effect and the year effects do not. The industry effect coefficients are all negative, 
and the models explain about 13% of total executive compensation.  
However, when factors that control for characteristics of the CEO and for the target 
company are added to the model, the variables of significance differ. All but two industries no 
longer showed the statistically significant influence on total compensation. All three of the 
CEO and company specific controls (CEO tenure, CEO age, company market value), 
however, are significant at the 10% level. The coefficients of the age and market value 
variables are significant at the 1% level and are positive, indicating that CEOs at larger firms 
receive higher compensation, as expected. The tenure variable has a negative coefficient 
suggesting that the longer the CEO has been in place then his or her compensation will be 
lower. This correlation could be explained by the fact that recently hired executives demand 
higher salaries to move firms or take a certain position. The model with these new controls 
explains over 25% of total CEO compensation. 
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Simply because the activist involvement variable is not significant in the initial 
regressions does not necessarily mean the activist investors do not have an impact on total 
compensation. It may be that the activist impact is tied to relative influence and size of the 
activist group.  Possibly, less influential and smaller activists have less influence on 
compensation changes than larger, better known activist funds or that they do not have the 
resources to focus on CEO compensation in addition to their other agendas. The AUM and 
WSJ interaction variables will magnify the effect of the more influential activists and could 
represent a significant impact on compensation.  
When the regressions are run including the AUM and WSJ variables, the model 
becomes more complete. The R-squared of the complete models increases by over 10% 
signifying that an additional 10% of total CEO compensation can be explained by the model 
when the activist characteristic variables are incorporated.13 Additionally, both the AUM and 
WSJ variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. Interestingly, both activist variables 
have positive coefficients implying that larger, highly-publicized activist investors are 
associated with targets where CEO compensation is higher. While the higher level of total 
CEO compensation may not be a direct result of activist agendas this result may serve to 
refute the point that activists are intent on reducing executive pay as many managers at 
investment targets might fear.  
 
B. Bonus Compensation 
Regression Table B shows the regression of the determinants of the level of executive 
bonus pay. In the base regression, the activist effect variable is the only statistically significant 
                                                 
13
 The determinants in the model including this publicity effect explain roughly 36% of total CEO 
compensation. 
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variable. The coefficient on the activist effect variable is negative and material, suggesting 
that the presence of the activist investor leads to a steeply lower level of bonus compensation 
for the CEOs of target companies. The base model explains just under 10% of CEO bonus 
pay.  
However, when the year effects are incorporated into the regression model, the activist 
effect variable is no longer significant. The year effects variables are all significant at the 5% 
level and negative. This discovery implies that the activist presence indicator variable was 
simply a proxy for the year effects, and that bonus pay was largely determined by the 
changing economic trends and not company specific metrics. When the company and CEO 
variables are incorporated into the model, the year effects remain statistically significant as 
well as the age of the CEO and market value of the target. Both of the variables are positive, 
but the market value coefficient is very small and may not have a material impact on 
executive bonus pay. The new variables account for over 26% of model. 
When the activist magnifying variables AUM and WSJ are incorporated into the 
model there is limited change. The activist variables are not significant in any of the models 
and the coefficients are unchanged. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that activist 
involvement would be correlated with a drop in fixed CEO pay, but would not be surprising if 
there is a material decrease in CEO salary – the larger component of fixed compensation. 
 
C. Salary Compensation 
Regression Table C shows the regression output for the determinants of the salary 
portion of executive compensation. The executive salary model is the most complete, with the 
statistically significant variables explaining over 45% of the level of CEO salary 
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compensation. As with total compensation, the activist entry variable is not significant when it 
alone is included in the model. Several industry, CEO, and company controls are the 
statistically significant variables in the complete models on CEO salary: CEO age and firm’s 
market value have positive coefficients, as anticipated, and are significant at the 1% level. The 
industry controls each have a negative coefficient and are also significant at the 1% level.  
 When the activist interaction variables are incorporated they are both statistically 
significant at the 1% level in their respective regressions. As expected, the activist 
characteristic variables are negative indicating that a decrease of CEO’s salaries is correlated 
with investment by more powerful activists (those with highest AUM and most WSJ 
coverage). This is consistent with activists desire to have CEOs minimally compensated with 
fixed pay and instead be paid for their company’s performance. The coefficients on the 
activist specific variables, however, are relatively small. The AUM coefficient indicates that 
for each additional $100 million of assets under management of the activist, target CEO salary 
decreases by about $1,600. For every additional mention in the Wall Street Journal, CEO 
salary is $755 lower. These results seem immaterial but the coefficient is still economically 
important as it may represent activists’ intentions. 
 
D. NEI Compensation 
Regression Table D shows the regression output for the determinants of non-equity 
incentive compensation of CEOs. Under NEI plans, CEOs receive cash payouts dependent on 
the company hitting certain targets. Common targets include growth, revenue, and 
profitability goals set out by the company’s compensation committee. It was hypothesized that 
if activist investors did indeed have a meaningful role or interest in redesigning executive 
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compensation plans it would be expressed very clearly in an increase in NEI compensation. 
The results of the series of regressions, however, do not confirm this hypothesis as clearly as 
was anticipated.  
The resulting outputs of the initial regressions are very similar to the regressions run 
on determinants of CEO bonuses. The activist presence variable and industry variables are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level leaving only the year effects and market value of the 
investment target as the statistically significant determinants at the 5% or 1% levels. Similar 
to the regressions on CEO bonuses, these determinants explain about 27% of the model on 
NEI plans.  
When the individual activist WSJ variable is incorporated into the model, there is no 
discernable impact on the model as the coefficient on the WSJ term is not statistically 
significant. However, when the AUM variable is added to the model, it is significant at the 5% 
level and an additional 2% of CEO NEI pay is explained by the model. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient on the AUM term is negative, which runs counter to expectations. This coefficient 
indicates that the larger activist investors are associated with lower incentive-based pay at 
targets companies. However, the coefficient on the AUM term is very small. If this negative 
coefficient is seen in conjunction with a large positive and statistically significant effect in the 
RSU regressions it would be more understandable and would not completely run in the face of 
this paper’s hypothesis on the effect on incentive based CEO compensation. 
 
E. RSU Compensation 
Regression Table E shows the regression output for the determinants of RSU 
compensation. Due to the fact that RSUs are incentive based and less risky than options, it 
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was hypothesized that activist involvement would lead to an increase in the level of RSUs. At 
the same time, other factors such as the move away from options due to economic trends, and 
firm conditions would most likely also lead to an increase in RSUs. 
The initial set of regressions, however, show that the activist involvement dummy 
variable was not a statistically significant determinant of the level of RSUs received by the 
CEOs of target companies. Instead, CEO tenure, market value, and some year fixed effects are 
significant and explain about 28% of the model on RSU pay. Using the same set of 
assumptions before, that the true activist effect may be masked by smaller, less influential 
firms failing to influence CEO compensation, the regressions are run again including the WSJ 
and AUM variables.  
Both activist variables (AUM and WSJ) are significant at the 1% level and have 
material, positive coefficients. The R-squared value increases to about .36, thus the new 
determinants of RSU compensation explain 36% of the model as opposed to the 28% when 
run without the AUM or WSJ activist controls. The AUM and WSJ coefficients are both 
positive and significantly larger than the negative coefficients in the NEI model. This implies 
a net positive relation between activist involvement and incentive based pay – in line with the 
theoretical ideals of the activists. The AUM coefficient of .694 implies that for every $10 
million of AUM, the level of RSUs increases by over $6,900. For every additional mention of 
the activist investor in the WSJ, RSU pay increases by about $26,400. This is in line with 
expectations of both the significance of the activist presence on RSUs and, that as the size and 
power of the activist increases so does the material impact on compensation.14 
 
VI. Option Compensation 
                                                 
14
 Fixed Pay net coefficient (RSU+NEI): AUM = .626, WSJ = 25.38  
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Regression Table F shows the regression output for the determinants of the level of the 
option component of compensation. As noted before, the financial crisis was expected to have 
a large negative impact on the level and value of options issued to executives. With options 
failing to be “in the money”, and increased attention paid to the options issued, it was 
hypothesized that the year effect would be both statistically significant and negative. 
Furthermore, it was also expected that activists would have an interest in reducing options 
issued. 
The initial regressions indicate some activist impact on CEO option awards. The 
activist variable is significant at the 5% level and has a material and negative coefficient. The 
analysis indicated that the presence of an activist translates into a $2.7 million drop in options 
issued. However, when the year effects are added to the model, no variables are significant at 
the 5% level. The CEO and company specific variables are not statistically significant either. 
Furthermore, the complete model explains only about 12% of CEO option compensation. 
When the regressions are run again including the activist magnifying variables (AUM and 
WSJ) similarly no variables are significant at the 5% level. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
While the evidence is not as conclusive as hypothesized and does not extend to all 
aspects of CEO compensation, there is some data that suggests a statistically significant 
impact of activist investment on compensation. Despite the lack of a statistically significant 
relationship between the activist terms and stock option levels, the significance correlation of 
the WSJ and AUM variables on total CEO compensation, CEO salary compensation, and 
CEO RSU compensation at the 1% would suggest that activists do pursue and execute 
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meaningful CEO compensation agendas at their investment targets. Furthermore, the negative 
relationship with fixed compensation and positive relationship with incentive based 
compensation (and total compensation) suggests that the focus of activists is on aligning a 
larger portion of compensation towards incentive based pay.  
However, the presence of statistically significant variables does not necessarily mean 
that the changes in RSU and compensation are determined by activist investors. The 
correlation of these variables with CEO compensation does not imply causation. While it 
would follow that these changes could be caused by the activist, they could also be a factor of 
other trends not accounted for in the model. Most importantly, because activists target 
underperforming companies, compensation reform may be expected to help reform struggling 
companies. It would then follow that RSUs are the subject of organic compensation reform 
and not impacted by activists. 
While this is a concern that may call some this paper’s findings into question, this can 
be refuted by some direct input from activist investors.  In a conversation with Todd L. 
Leigh15, a senior partner at Relational Investors, about the possibility of compensation reform 
without the influence of an activist, Mr. Leigh answered succinctly, “No way.” He went on to 
qualify his response by stating “The only time comp. plans [sic] might change is when the 
company goes through a compensation consultant change which is very rare”. Mr. Leigh also 
stated that at Relational Investors, somewhere between 50 and 70% of projects involve 
compensation as an agenda item, claiming that executive compensation is commonly “at the 
root of the issue” effecting the target company’s capital allocation and business scenarios.  
If the results of this paper are in fact a true representation of activist investors’ 
pursuits, they are significant in dispelling a factor of the negative connotations attached to 
                                                 
15
 Conversation with Todd L. Leigh of Relational Investors LLC took place via a phone call on 11/22/2010 
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activists and could allay the fears of CEOs of target companies. According to Holderness and 
Sheehan (1985) a stigma exists that activists are purely “corporate raiders who reduce the 
wealth of other stockholders.” With the focus on aligning CEO compensation with 
shareholder returns, this research would in fact imply the opposite – that the presence of 
activist investors is beneficial to existing shareholders as management’s focus is directed on 
the shareholders’ interests. Likewise, the positive coefficients on the activist terms counteract 
fears CEOs may have of activist involvement. Instead of slashing CEO pay as CEOs may 
expect, activists in actuality move to increase pay (particularly RSUs) if the companies 
perform. This, too, is supported by Mr. Leigh’s claims that Relational Investors is “happy to 
[have CEOs] paid more” if companies meet or exceed performance metrics and that 
compensation reform on the whole is “not about lowering the amount of compensation, [but] 
instead on making sure incentives are balanced”.16 
                                                 
16
 Conversation with Todd L. Leigh of Relational Investors LLC 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Activist Investors 
groups and activism events 
Investor Events 
Relational 
Investors 12 
Shamrock Capital 9 
Pershing Square 8 
Icahn Associates 7 
Barrington Capital 6 
Breeden Capital 6 
Trian Fund 5 
Chieftain Capital 4 
Third Point 4 
Baupost Capital 3 
Jana Partners 2 
Pirate Capital 1 
2007 29 
2008 38 
 
Table 2: Activist AUM (millions) and WSJ reference 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
aumActivist 196 3,860 3,778 100 18,500 
wsjActivist 196 50 93 1 443 
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Table 3: Participant Companies 
  Ticker Company 
1 ACCO Acco Brands Corp 
2 ADI Analog Devices 
3 ANN AnnTaylor Stores Corp 
4 ARRS Arris Group 
5 AXP American Express Company 
6 BAC Bank of America Corp 
7 BKS Barnes & Noble 
8 BNI 
Burlington Northern Santa Fe 
Corp 
9 CAKE The Cheesecake Factory 
10 COF Capital One Financial Corp 
11 CRL Charles River Labratories 
12 CVG Convergys Corp 
13 DDS Dillard's 
14 DELL Dell 
15 DPS Dr. Pepper Snapple Group 
16 DST DST Systems 
17 EMC EMC Corp 
18 FRZ Reddy Ice Holdings 
19 GENZ Genzyme Corp 
20 GLRE Greenlight Capital 
21 HAR Harman International Industries 
22 HI Hilenbrand 
23 HLNQ Hilton Hotels 
24 HRC Hilenbrand 
25 IR Ingersoll-Rand 
26 IRF International Rectifier Corp 
27 JTX Jackson Hewitt Tax Service 
28 LCAPA Liberty Media Corp 
29 LO Lorillad 
30 M Macy's 
31 MBI MBIA Inc 
32 MBIA MBIA Inc 
33 MOT Motorolla 
34 PCP Precision Castparts Corp 
35 PLT Plantronics 
36 PM Phillip Morris International 
37 PNRA Panera Bread Company 
38 RDEN Elizabeth Arden 
39 S Sprint Nextel Corp 
40 SHLD Sears Holding Corp 
41 SJM The JM Smuckers Company 
42 TBI TrueBlue 
43 TELK Telik 
44 TGT Target Corp 
45 TIF Tiffany & Co 
46 TTWO Take-Two Interactive Software 
47 TXI Texas Industries 
48 V Visa 
49 WBSN Websense 
50 WEN Wendy's Arby's Group 
51 YHOO Yahoo! 
52 ZBRA Zebra Technology Corp 
53 ZLC Zale Corp 
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Table 4: Total Sample CEO compensation for years 2005-2009 
($millions) 
Comp Year # CEOs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
2005 38 10.65 11.91 0 53.28 
 
2006 37 10.16 13.83 0.56 80.02 
 
2007 41 7.55 9.13 0 51.69 
 
2008 44 8.51 9.68 0 43.24 
 
2009 36 7.79 8.66 0.01 47.23 
 
 
 
Table 5: Sample CEO salary for years 2005-2009 (% total comp)  
Salary Year # CEOs Mean % Total Std. Dev. Min Max 
2005 37 16.9% 12.9% 0.0% 60.1% 
2006 37 21.5% 18.0% 0.0% 76.4% 
2007 41 24.6% 22.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
2008 44 22.7% 20.8% 0.0% 100.0% 
2009 36 17.7% 12.6% 0.0% 56.2% 
 
 
Table 6: Sample CEO bonus for years 2005-2009 (% total comp) 
Bonus Year # CEOs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2005 37 18.0% 13.9% 0.0% 52.7% 
2006 37 7.0% 17.2% 0.0% 73.4% 
2007 41 2.1% 6.2% 0.0% 28.8% 
2008 44 3.5% 11.7% 0.0% 70.1% 
2009 36 2.5% 7.3% 0.0% 30.5% 
 
 
Table 7: Sample CEO Non-Equity Incentives for years 2005-2009 (% total comp) 
NEI Year #CEOs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
  
2005 37 3.7% 11.3% 0.0% 51.9% 
  
2006 37 21.4% 23.6% 0.0% 80.3% 
  
2007 41 14.6% 17.5% 0.0% 61.0% 
  
2008 44 11.7% 14.4% 0.0% 53.7% 
  
2009 36 21.1% 18.0% 0.0% 60.9% 
  
 
 
  
32 
Table 8: Sample CEO Restricted Stock Units for years 2005-2009 (% total 
comp) 
RSU Year # CEOs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
2005 37 15.2% 19.1% 0.0% 55.1% 
 
2006 37 17.5% 22.1% 0.0% 60.4% 
 
2007 41 16.3% 21.4% 0.0% 76.9% 
 
2008 44 28.6% 25.2% 0.0% 96.8% 
 
2009 36 31.7% 23.3% 0.0% 85.0% 
 
      
 
 
 
Table 9: Sample CEO Options for years 2005-2009 (% total comp) 
Option Year # CEOs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2005 37 42.8% 29.1% 0.0% 99.4% 
2006 37 28.1% 28.8% 0.0% 99.2% 
2007 41 29.1% 28.3% 0.0% 99.6% 
2008 44 21.4% 21.4% 0.0% 69.2% 
2009 36 16.7% 19.5% 0.0% 79.2% 
 
 
Table 10: All ExecuComp total CEO compensation for years 2005-2009 ($millions) 
Comp Year # CEOs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
   
2005 1010 9.50 20.25 0 295.14 
   
2006 1402 8.67 16.51 0.05 304.60 
   
2007 1531 8.69 20.06 0 556.98 
   
2008 1419 7.98 43.86 0 1,589.84 
   
2009 1320 5.32 7.43 0.01 106.04 
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Table 11a: Compensation % graphics   
  bonus salary NEI RSU  Option 
2005 16.9% 18.0% 3.7% 15.2% 42.8% 
2006 21.5% 7.0% 21.4% 17.5% 28.1% 
2007 24.6% 2.1% 14.6% 16.3% 29.1% 
2008 22.7% 3.5% 11.7% 28.6% 21.4% 
2009 17.7% 2.5% 21.1% 31.7% 16.7% 
 
Table 11b: Compensation % graphics 
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Regression Tables 
For all tables: 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Regression Table A: Total Compensation Regression Results                   
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES TotalComp TotalComp TotalComp  VARIABLES TotalComp TotalComp TotalComp  VARIABLES TotalComp TotalComp TotalComp 
                          
activist -2,416 -3,231 383.0  activist -2,264 -2,429 1,519  activist -2,657* -3,303 368.0 
  (1,671) (2,978) (2,926)    (1,619) (2,890) (2,732)    (1,604) (2,854) (2,707) 
ind40 -2,092 -2,173 -12,482**  aumActivist 0.744*** 0.746*** 0.946***  wsjActivist 32.76*** 32.96*** 38.53*** 
  (5,132) (5,163) (5,482)    (0.202) (0.204) (0.186)    (7.899) (7.936) (7.269) 
ind45 -11,641** -11,757** -6,334  ind40 -1,233 -1,247 -11,964**  ind40 -2,484 -2,551 -13,067** 
  (4,786) (4,825) (4,439)    (4,974) (5,002) (5,103)    (4,924) (4,949) (5,073) 
ind20 -11,510** -11,662** -5,334  ind45 -10,587** -10,598** -5,243  ind45 -13,347*** -13,443*** -9,036** 
  (5,209) (5,253) (4,809)    (4,642) (4,680) (4,137)    (4,610) (4,642) (4,138) 
ind25 -12,636*** -12,660*** -8,213*  ind20 -8,374 -8,403 -1,307  ind20 -10,843** -10,962** -4,569 
  (4,768) (4,794) (4,381)    (5,114) (5,160) (4,545)    (4,999) (5,037) (4,451) 
ind35 -11,376** -11,539** -6,315  ind25 -9,712** -9,685** -5,228  ind25 -12,875*** -12,888*** -8,988** 
  (5,308) (5,356) (4,982)    (4,683) (4,710) (4,119)    (4,574) (4,595) (4,056) 
ind30 -9,258* -9,109 -7,901  ind35 -10,032* -10,062* -5,298  ind35 -11,304** -11,432** -7,882* 
  (5,462) (5,523) (5,083)    (5,151) (5,199) (4,641)    (5,092) (5,133) (4,619) 
ind15 -17,509** -17,444** -14,241**  ind30 -6,447 -6,142 -4,537  ind30 -9,856* -9,657* -9,098* 
  (6,886) (6,926) (6,303)    (5,342) (5,406) (4,777)    (5,242) (5,295) (4,708) 
y2006  -520.1 -306.1  ind15 -13,767** -13,758** -10,614*  ind15 -16,661** -16,611** -13,833** 
   (2,381) (2,214)    (6,743) (6,777) (5,910)    (6,609) (6,640) (5,832) 
y2007  -3,134 -2,495  y2006  -380.7 -33.95  y2006  -229.7 147.6 
   (2,326) (2,226)     (2,304) (2,061)     (2,283) (2,050) 
y2008  -749.5 284.4  y2007  -3,146 -2,221  y2007  -3,153 -2,198 
   (2,630) (2,555)     (2,251) (2,072)     (2,229) (2,060) 
y2009  -161.0 -1,175  y2008  -1,086 28.58  y2008  -739.9 691.4 
   (3,706) (3,688)     (2,547) (2,379)     (2,521) (2,365) 
ceoage   414.5***  y2009  -1,032 -2,185  y2009  -321.4 -911.9 
    (143.1)     (3,594) (3,438)     (3,552) (3,412) 
tenure   -224.5*  ceoage   501.0***  ceoage   500.3*** 
    (120.8)      (134.2)      (133.3) 
mktvaluetotal   0.136***  tenure   -227.2**  tenure   -108.1 
    (0.0291)      (112.5)      (113.9) 
Constant 20,187*** 21,426*** -7,873  mktvaluetotal   0.116***  mktvaluetotal   0.130*** 
  (4,636) (4,861) (9,414)      (0.0274)      (0.0270) 
       Constant 15,291*** 16,473*** -18,505**  Constant 19,203*** 20,344*** -14,427 
Observations 196 196 177    (4,681) (4,894) (9,008)    (4,454) (4,665) (8,797) 
R-squared 0.122 0.133 0.254               
      Observations 196 196 177  Observations 196 196 177 
          R-squared 0.182 0.192 0.357   R-squared 0.197 0.208 0.365 
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Regression Table B: Bonus Compensation Regression Results                 
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES bonus bonus bonus  VARIABLES bonus bonus bonus  VARIABLES bonus bonus bonus 
                          
activst -627.8** -474.1 -340.6  activst -632.9** -501.2 -324.0  activst 
-
627.0** -473.8 -340.9 
  (249.1) (418.9) (409.6)    (249.4) (420.4) (412.0)    (249.9) (420.0) (410.4) 
ind40 769.7 785.1 -703.3  aumActivist -0.0250 -0.0252 0.0138  wsjActivst -0.110 -0.176 0.673 
  (764.8) (726.2) (767.5)    (0.0311) (0.0296) (0.0280)    (1.230) (1.168) (1.102) 
ind45 -569.3 -548.9 -263.1  ind40 740.9 753.8 -695.8  ind40 771.0 787.1 -713.5 
  (713.2) (678.6) (621.5)    (766.4) (727.6) (769.5)    (767.0) (728.2) (769.2) 
ind20 -143.5 -111.4 314.4  ind45 -604.6 -588.1 -247.2  ind45 -563.6 -539.9 -310.3 
  (776.2) (738.8) (673.2)    (715.2) (680.7) (623.8)    (718.0) (683.1) (627.5) 
ind25 -103.2 -81.06 144.1  ind20 -248.8 -221.5 373.0  ind20 -145.7 -115.2 327.7 
  (710.5) (674.3) (613.3)    (787.9) (750.6) (685.3)    (778.6) (741.2) (674.9) 
ind35 -607.5 -576.7 -405.4  ind25 -201.3 -181.5 187.6  ind25 -102.4 -79.85 130.6 
  (791.0) (753.4) (697.5)    (721.6) (685.1) (621.1)    (712.4) (676.1) (614.9) 
ind30 311.7 453.3 422.8  ind35 -652.5 -626.6 -390.6  ind35 -607.7 -577.3 -432.7 
  (813.9) (776.9) (711.6)    (793.8) (756.3) (699.8)    (793.1) (755.4) (700.3) 
ind15 -655.0 -659.8 -544.7  ind30 217.3 353.1 471.8  ind30 313.7 456.2 401.9 
  (1,026) (974.1) (882.5)    (823.1) (786.3) (720.2)    (816.4) (779.2) (713.8) 
y2006  -1,327*** -1,452***  ind15 -780.6 -784.2 -491.8  ind15 -657.8 -664.2 -537.5 
   (334.9) (309.9)    (1,039) (985.8) (891.1)    (1,029) (977.2) (884.3) 
y2007  -1,490*** -1,403***  y2006  
-
1,332*** -1,448***  y2006  
-
1,329*** -1,444*** 
   (327.2) (311.6)     (335.2) (310.8)     (336.0) (310.8) 
y2008  -1,163*** -907.9**  y2007  
-
1,489*** -1,399***  y2007  
-
1,489*** -1,398*** 
   (370.0) (357.8)     (327.4) (312.4)     (328.0) (312.3) 
y2009  -1,134** -1,108**  y2008  
-
1,152*** -911.7**  y2008  
-
1,163*** -900.8** 
   (521.2) (516.3)     (370.5) (358.7)     (371.0) (358.7) 
ceoage   43.74**  y2009  -1,105** -1,122**  y2009  -1,133** -1,103** 
    (20.03)     (522.8) (518.4)     (522.7) (517.4) 
tenure   -7.982  ceoage   44.99**  ceoage   45.23** 
    (16.92)      (20.24)      (20.22) 
mktvaluetotal   0.00833**  tenure   -8.021  tenure   -5.948 
    (0.00408)      (16.96)      (17.27) 
Constant 939.9 1,901*** -955.0  mktvaluetotal   0.00803*  mktvaluetotal   0.00822** 
  (690.9) (683.7) (1,318)      (0.00413)      (0.00409) 
       Constant 1,104 2,068*** -1,110  Constant 943.2 1,907*** -1,069 
Observations 196 196 177    (721.3) (711.9) (1,358)    (693.7) (686.6) (1,334) 
R-squared 0.096 0.204 0.262               
      Observations 196 196 177  Observations 196 196 177 
          R-squared 0.099 0.207 0.263   R-squared 0.096 0.204 0.263 
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Regression Table C: Salary Compensation Regression Results                 
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES salary salary salary  VARIABLES salary salary salary  VARIABLES salary salary salary 
                          
activist -67.35 -182.4* -30.47  activist -70.63 -200.5* -51.59  activist -61.13 -180.5* -30.18 
  (60.72) (108.3) (100.2)    (60.17) (107.5) (98.72)    (59.61) (106.2) (97.99) 
ind40 
-
559.1*** 
-
570.6*** -1,000***  aumActivist -0.0161** -0.0169** -0.0176***  wsjActivist 
-
0.844*** 
-
0.852*** -0.755*** 
  (186.4) (187.8) (187.7)    (0.00751) (0.00757) (0.00672)    (0.293) (0.295) (0.263) 
ind45 
-
622.8*** 
-
641.0*** -470.3***  ind40 -577.7*** -591.6*** -1,010***  ind40 
-
549.0*** 
-
560.9*** -988.6*** 
  (173.9) (175.5) (152.0)    (184.9) (186.0) (184.4)    (183.0) (184.2) (183.6) 
ind20 -364.6* -385.6** -131.3  ind45 -645.6*** -667.3*** -490.6***  ind45 
-
578.9*** 
-
597.4*** -417.4*** 
  (189.2) (191.1) (164.6)    (172.6) (174.0) (149.5)    (171.3) (172.8) (149.8) 
ind25 -362.8** -370.9** -169.8  ind20 -432.4** -459.5** -206.2  ind20 -381.8** -403.7** -146.3 
  (173.2) (174.4) (150.0)    (190.1) (191.9) (164.2)    (185.7) (187.5) (161.1) 
ind35 -299.3 -322.3* -209.7  ind25 -426.0** -438.4** -225.3  ind25 -356.7** -365.0** -154.6 
  (192.8) (194.9) (170.6)    (174.1) (175.1) (148.8)    (169.9) (171.0) (146.8) 
ind30 -173.5 -201.2 -151.3  ind35 -328.3* -355.8* -228.6  ind35 -301.1 -325.1* -179.0 
  (198.4) (200.9) (174.0)    (191.5) (193.4) (167.7)    (189.2) (191.1) (167.2) 
ind15 
-
769.6*** 
-
759.4*** -582.8***  ind30 -234.3 -268.5 -213.8  ind30 -158.1 -187.0 -127.9 
  (250.2) (251.9) (215.8)    (198.6) (201.0) (172.6)    (194.7) (197.1) (170.4) 
y2006  6.225 -16.15  ind15 -850.5*** -842.9*** -650.3***  ind15 
-
791.4*** 
-
780.9*** -590.8*** 
   (86.62) (75.79)    (250.7) (252.0) (213.5)    (245.6) (247.2) (211.1) 
y2007  15.48 72.04  y2006  3.065 -21.21  y2006  -1.282 -25.04 
   (84.61) (76.19)     (85.70) (74.47)     (84.97) (74.21) 
y2008  87.95 161.2*  y2007  15.75 66.96  y2007  15.97 66.23 
   (95.68) (87.48)     (83.71) (74.87)     (82.97) (74.57) 
y2009  164.7 125.8  y2008  95.59 166.0*  y2008  87.70 153.3* 
   (134.8) (126.3)     (94.72) (85.95)     (93.83) (85.63) 
ceoage   15.92***  y2009  184.4 144.5  y2009  168.9 120.6 
    (4.897)     (133.7) (124.2)     (132.2) (123.5) 
tenure   4.943  ceoage   14.32***  ceoage   14.24*** 
    (4.137)      (4.850)      (4.827) 
mktvaluetotal   0.00702***  tenure   4.993  tenure   2.662 
    (0.000997)      (4.064)      (4.124) 
Constant 1,351*** 1,342*** 100.6  mktvaluetotal   0.00740***  mktvaluetotal   0.00714*** 
  (168.4) (176.8) (322.3)      (0.000990)      (0.000976) 
       Constant 1,457*** 1,454*** 298.2  Constant 1,376*** 1,370*** 228.9 
Observations 196 196 177    (174.0) (182.0) (325.5)    (165.5) (173.7) (318.5) 
R-squared 0.171 0.179 0.432               
      Observations 196 196 177  Observations 196 196 177 
          R-squared 0.191 0.201 0.455   R-squared 0.206 0.215 0.459 
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Regression Table D: NEI Compensation Regression Results                 
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES neilevel neilevel neilevel  VARIABLES neilevel neilevel neilevel  VARIABLES neilevel neilevel neilevel 
                          
activist 187.6 -893.6* -106.0  activist 177.6 -951.8** -187.6  activist 195.0 -891.5* -105.6 
  (278.5) (476.7) (486.1)    (277.9) (476.0) (482.9)    (279.1) (477.3) (486.7) 
ind40 523.1 415.0 -1,102  aumActivist -0.0486 -0.0541 -0.0679**  wsjActivist -1.009 -0.945 -1.012 
  (855.3) (826.3) (910.8)    (0.0347) (0.0335) (0.0329)    (1.374) (1.327) (1.307) 
ind45 -365.9 -520.8 -16.46  ind40 467.1 347.9 -1,140  ind40 535.2 425.9 -1,087 
  (797.6) (772.2) (737.5)    (854.0) (823.8) (901.9)    (856.5) (827.6) (912.2) 
ind20 263.5 76.69 810.6  ind45 -434.7 -604.9 -94.84  ind45 -313.3 -472.4 54.49 
  (868.0) (840.7) (798.9)    (797.1) (770.6) (731.1)    (801.8) (776.2) (744.1) 
ind25 -96.37 -164.3 567.0  ind20 58.74 -159.6 521.4  ind20 243.0 56.61 790.5 
  (794.5) (767.3) (727.9)    (878.0) (849.8) (803.2)    (869.5) (842.3) (800.3) 
ind35 -355.0 -571.2 -5.322  ind25 -287.3 -380.1 352.5  ind25 -89.02 -157.8 587.3 
  (884.6) (857.3) (827.8)    (804.2) (775.6) (728.0)    (795.6) (768.4) (729.2) 
ind30 1,321 1,112 1,592*  ind35 -442.7 -678.3 -78.35  ind35 -357.2 -574.3 35.83 
  (910.2) (884.0) (844.5)    (884.6) (856.2) (820.2)    (885.7) (858.5) (830.5) 
ind15 -120.2 0.0289 699.9  ind30 1,137 897.3 1,351  ind30 1,339 1,128 1,624* 
  (1,148) (1,108) (1,047)    (917.3) (890.2) (844.1)    (911.7) (885.5) (846.5) 
y2006  1,190*** 1,123***  ind15 -364.6 -267.3 439.4  ind15 -146.3 -23.86 689.2 
   (381.1) (367.8)    (1,158) (1,116) (1,044)    (1,150) (1,111) (1,049) 
y2007  511.3 625.6*  y2006  1,179*** 1,104***  y2006  1,181*** 1,111*** 
   (372.3) (369.8)     (379.5) (364.2)     (381.8) (368.6) 
y2008  1,081** 868.1**  y2007  512.2 605.9*  y2007  511.8 617.8* 
   (421.0) (424.6)     (370.7) (366.2)     (372.8) (370.4) 
y2009  2,107*** 1,372**  y2008  1,105*** 886.4**  y2008  1,081** 857.4** 
   (593.1) (612.7)     (419.4) (420.4)     (421.5) (425.3) 
ceoage   14.86  y2009  2,170*** 1,445**  y2009  2,112*** 1,365** 
    (23.77)     (591.8) (607.6)     (594.0) (613.6) 
tenure   18.15  ceoage   8.651  ceoage   12.61 
    (20.08)      (23.72)      (23.97) 
mktvaluetotal   0.0235***  tenure   18.34  tenure   15.09 
    (0.00484)      (19.88)      (20.49) 
Constant 1,023 477.8 -1,386  mktvaluetotal   0.0250***  mktvaluetotal   0.0237*** 
  (772.6) (778.0) (1,564)      (0.00484)      (0.00485) 
       Constant 1,343* 837.0 -622.3  Constant 1,053 508.9 -1,214 
Observations 196 196 177    (803.8) (805.9) (1,592)    (774.7) (780.2) (1,582) 
R-squared 0.068 0.151 0.263               
      Observations 196 196 177  Observations 196 196 177 
          R-squared 0.078 0.163 0.282   R-squared 0.071 0.153 0.266 
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Regression Table E: RSU Compensation Regression Results                 
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES rsulevel rsulevel rsulevel  VARIABLES rsulevel rsulevel rsulevel  VARIABLES rsulevel rsulevel rsulevel 
                          
activist 951.0 -293.9 680.2  activist -1502 -2511* -1459  activist -589.9 -1822 -737.8 
  (727.1) (1,294) (1,316)    (918.2) (1353) (1333)    (765.5) (1270) (1273) 
ind40 -1,218 -1,343 -4,548*  aumActivist 0.664*** 0.670*** 0.694***  wsjActivist 27.45*** 27.54*** 26.39*** 
  (2,232) (2,243) (2,466)    (0.161) (0.163) (0.155)    (5.906) (5.921) (5.590) 
ind45 -4,387** -4,592** -1,780  ind40 -865.0 -960.8 -4397*  ind40 -1480 -1603 -5087** 
  (2,082) (2,096) (1,997)    (2145) (2153) (2332)    (2120) (2127) (2320) 
ind20 -4,117* -4,372* -1,777  ind45 -3826* -3991** -1283  ind45 -4931** -5137** -2467 
  (2,266) (2,282) (2,163)    (2003) (2016) (1891)    (1979) (1991) (1882) 
ind25 -4,698** -4,791** -2,478  ind20 -3190 -3401 -781.4  ind20 -4213* -4468** -1863 
  (2,074) (2,083) (1,970)    (2187) (2201) (2057)    (2150) (2164) (2033) 
ind35 -4,133* -4,382* -1,110  ind25 -3665* -3737* -1452  ind25 -4792** -4886** -2626 
  (2,309) (2,327) (2,241)    (2007) (2014) (1877)    (1968) (1974) (1852) 
ind30 -2,007 -2,284 -1,107  ind35 -3526 -3718* -616.9  ind35 -4240* -4486** -1539 
  (2,376) (2,400) (2,286)    (2222) (2238) (2122)    (2192) (2206) (2108) 
ind15 -6,332** -6,283** -4,086  ind30 -1064 -1299 -92.29  ind30 -2214 -2495 -1423 
  (2,996) (3,009) (2,835)    (2292) (2314) (2174)    (2255) (2275) (2149) 
y2006  226.6 131.6  ind15 -5223* -5211* -2984  ind15 -6242** -6201** -4037 
   (1,034) (995.7)    (2888) (2898) (2692)    (2843) (2852) (2664) 
y2007  -494.2 -36.06  y2006  222.0 95.03  y2006  218.6 103.3 
   (1,011) (1,001)     (992.1) (941.7)     (980.6) (935.8) 
y2008  1,303 2,037*  y2007  -511.6 -95.35  y2007  -500.0 -37.83 
   (1,143) (1,149)     (969.2) (946.7)     (957.9) (940.8) 
y2009  1,440 1,426  y2008  1335 2006*  y2008  1346 2081* 
   (1,610) (1,659)     (1096) (1087)     (1083) (1080) 
ceoage   81.91  y2009  1016 751.8  y2009  1394 1348 
    (64.34)     (1548) (1576)     (1526) (1559) 
tenure   -138.2**  ceoage   82.81  ceoage   94.07 
    (54.35)      (60.85)      (60.52) 
mktvaluetotal   0.0708***  tenure   -114.8**  tenure   -107.0** 
    (0.0131)      (51.66)      (51.50) 
Constant 6,095*** 6,098*** -1,245  mktvaluetotal   0.0714***  mktvaluetotal   0.0719*** 
  (2,017) (2,112) (4,234)      (0.0124)      (0.0123) 
       Constant 5349*** 5326*** -2178  Constant 6349*** 6349*** -1835 
Observations 196 196 177    (1945) (2034) (4010)    (1915) (2003) (3981) 
R-squared 0.094 0.107 0.283               
      Observations 196 196 177  Observations 196 196 177 
          R-squared 0.169 0.183 0.363   R-squared 0.188 0.202 0.371 
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Regression Table F: Option Compensation Regression 
Results                   
  (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3)    (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES optionlevel optionlevel optionlevel  VARIABLES optionlevel optionlevel optionlevel  VARIABLES optionlevel optionlevel optionlevel 
                          
activist -2,730** -1,083 434.0  activist -2087 -541.8 827.0  activist -2496* -855.2 641.6 
  (1,238) (2,179) (2,325)    (1638) (2385) (2500)    (1381) (2264) (2400) 
ind40 -333.0 -168.3 -3,265  aumActivist -0.172 -0.162 -0.127  wsjActivist -4.080 -4.072 -3.849 
  (3,765) (3,776) (4,355)    (0.286) (0.288) (0.292)    (10.56) (10.58) (10.57) 
ind45 -4,206 -3,936 -2,324  ind40 -423.4 -260.6 -3289  ind40 -293.7 -129.6 -3184 
  (3,515) (3,532) (3,529)    (3775) (3787) (4367)    (3775) (3787) (4373) 
ind20 -5,438 -5,123 -3,004  ind45 -4342 -4073 -2408  ind45 -4120 -3851 -2219 
  (3,822) (3,842) (3,820)    (3528) (3547) (3544)    (3530) (3547) (3551) 
ind25 -5,667 -5,497 -4,553  ind20 -5675 -5357 -3183  ind20 -5422 -5108 -2990 
  (3,500) (3,509) (3,483)    (3849) (3872) (3852)    (3831) (3852) (3831) 
ind35 -4,558 -4,228 -2,974  ind25 -5934* -5754 -4743  ind25 -5653 -5483 -4532 
  (3,895) (3,918) (3,958)    (3534) (3545) (3519)    (3508) (3517) (3493) 
ind30 -7,311* -6,651 -6,792*  ind35 -4713 -4389 -3066  ind35 -4541 -4213 -2912 
  (4,007) (4,040) (4,039)    (3910) (3936) (3974)    (3904) (3928) (3973) 
ind15 -7,770 -7,885 -7,812  ind30 -7554* -6890* -6982*  ind30 -7280* -6620 -6749* 
  (5,053) (5,066) (5,007)    (4035) (4070) (4073)    (4017) (4050) (4051) 
y2006  -1,083 -606.2  ind15 -8055 -8143 -8015  ind15 -7783 -7896 -7820 
   (1,753) (1,772)    (5084) (5096) (5042)    (5064) (5078) (5021) 
y2007  -2,598 -2,775  y2006  -1080 -597.9  y2006  -1081 -601.7 
   (1,713) (1,783)     (1757) (1776)     (1758) (1776) 
y2008  -2,816 -2,873  y2007  -2591 -2761  y2007  -2596 -2773 
   (1,933) (2,042)     (1717) (1788)     (1718) (1788) 
y2009  -3,436 -3,840  y2008  -2823 -2864  y2008  -2822 -2878 
   (2,721) (2,949)     (1937) (2047)     (1938) (2047) 
ceoage   221.3*  y2009  -3322 -3702  y2009  -3423 -3820 
    (114.4)     (2734) (2974)     (2728) (2958) 
tenure   -110.0  ceoage   221.8*  ceoage   219.9* 
    (96.04)      (114.7)      (114.8) 
mktvaluetotal   0.0241  tenure   -114.4  tenure   -114.6 
    (0.0232)      (96.81)      (97.13) 
Constant 8,870*** 10,198*** -3,471  mktvaluetotal   0.0240  mktvaluetotal   0.0240 
  (3,402) (3,560) (7,528)      (0.0232)      (0.0232) 
       Constant 9058*** 10380*** -3338  Constant 8830** 10158*** -3408 
Observations 194 194 175    (3423) (3581) (7553)    (3412) (3570) (7550) 
R-squared 0.085 0.101 0.123               
      Observations 194 194 175  Observations 194 194 175 
          R-squared 0.087 0.103 0.124   R-squared 0.086 0.102 0.124 
              
 
